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Note
Getting Back to Basics: Recognizing and
Understanding the Swing Voter on the Supreme
Court of the United States
Kristin M. McGaver*

Justice Anthony Kennedy, depicted in Matt Bors’ cartoon,
1
Swing Vote Secrets: Inside the Mind of Justice Kennedy, has
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1. Matt Bors, Swing Vote Secrets: Inside the Mind of Justice Kennedy,
DAILY KOS (May 13, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/5/13/1384273/
-cartoon-swing-vote-secrets.

1247

MCGAVER_MLR

1248

1/25/2017 8:06 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1247

been labeled the swing voter of the Supreme Court since the
2
departure of his colleague Sandra Day O’Connor. Before
O’Connor, Justices Byron White and Lewis Powell were the
3
Supreme Court’s swing voters in the 1970s. And even earlier,
4
Justice Forman Reed carried the swing vote mantle.
It goes without saying that swing voters have a long and
storied history on the Court. But what does the term actually
mean? There is an extensive history and tradition of labeling
5
Supreme Court Justices as “swing” Justices. And yet the content of this label remains unclear. Some use the terms to convey a negative sentiment. Bors’ cartoon is a prime example of
this, insinuating that Kennedy used comical sources such as
tealeaves, daisies, Internet message boards, and a Magic 8 Ball
6
to decide his vote in seminal cases. Others suggest that being a
swing voter or swing Justice is undesirable by using words like
7
“wishy-washy” or even weak. At the same time, some use the
terms more positively, focusing on the power one person can
8
have to change law, policy, and even history. Complicating
2. See id.; see also Emily Bazelon, Swing Your Partner: O’Connor Versus
Kennedy as the Justice in the Middle, SLATE (June 20, 2008), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/06/swing_your_partner
.html (characterizing Kennedy as “a swinger who knows how to be in a longterm relationship” and O’Connor as “a bit of a tease” (emphasis added)).
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. Justice Reed was actually called a “swingman”—likely a hybrid role of
the swing Justice and median Justice if viewed in modern terms. For a discussion of this, see infra Part II.A.
5. These types of actors emerge in marginal cases or cases that address
socially divisive issues. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 84–85 (2007) (“What’s
the most important law at the Supreme Court? . . . ‘Five! The law of five! With
five votes, you can do anything around here!’” (quoting Justice Brennan)).
6. Bors, supra note 1; see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
7. Antonin Scalia, Senior Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at the 2015 Stein Lecture (Oct. 20, 2015) (answering a question about
the swing voter, Justice Scalia replied, “[i]t doesn’t seem to me to be leading
the Court but following the Court. I don’t know why anyone would aspire to
that”) (notes on file with author); see B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., The ‘Swing’
Justice: Byron Raymond White, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 16. It has also
jokingly been suggested that O’Connor used a Magic 8 Ball to make decisions.
See Jim Huber, On Sandra Day O’Connor’s Retirement, POLITICALLY CORRECT
(July 3, 2005), http://www.conservativecartoons.com/cartoon.php?toon=401.
8. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK 171 (James A.
Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015) (characterizing the swing voter as a
powerful dictator on the Court); Editorial, Supreme Sandra, AZ CENT. (July 3,
2003), http://archive.azcentral.com/specials/special47/articles/0703thur1-03
.html (calling O’Connor “Supreme Sandra” and “the single most powerful
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things further, there is sometimes a conflation between the
electoral swing voter and the judicial swing voter, failing to
separate the two as applied to the different branches of gov9
ernment. Most recently, another strain of confusion has
emerged thanks to scholarship showing that swing Justice and
median Justice may not always align, even though the two
10
terms are often used interchangeably.
This plethora of uses demonstrates that there is a multilayered and widespread confusion about what “swing” actually
means when applied to a Supreme Court Justice. In light of the
enormous importance the actors defined by these terms play in
shaping and defining the differences between law, politics, and
society in America, it is perhaps surprising to learn that schol11
ars have yet to trace the etymology of these terms. This gap in
existing scholarly literature is problematic: swing Justices are
among the most important and mythic figures in American legal and political life, and yet it is not entirely clear what this
title actually conveys. Thus, a thorough analysis of swing voter’s various meanings, its origin, and historical use is long
overdue.

woman in America”). For more positive or neutral depictions of Kennedy see,
for example, Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed, A Court of One: Anthony Kennedy, L.A.
TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oe-0702-hasen
-kennedy-court-20150630-story.html; Matt Purple, The “Swing Vote” on the
Supreme Court Is Actually a Libertarian, RARE (June 26, 2015), http://rare.us/
story/the-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-is-actually-a-libertarian; see also
Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The “Swing Voter” Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q.
209 (2004) (proposing an expanded conception of swing voting using Kennedy
as the prime example for study).
9. The electoral swing voter is the topic of a 2008 flop film featuring Kevin Costner as the determining vote in a presidential election. SWING VOTE
(Touchstone Pictures 2008); see also infra Part I.B.2.
10. See Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 J.
POL. 1089, 1090 (2013) (“While this justice will often be pivotal, the termspecific median justice does not always cast the fifth majority or deciding
vote.”); see also H. Roger Segelken, What Moves the Supreme Court’s ‘Swing’
Justices, CORNELL CHRON. (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.news.cornell.edu/
stories/2013/10/what-moves-supreme-court-s-swing-justices (proposing the
“swing Justice” casting the pivotal vote is not always the median of the Court).
11. The law-politics distinction “presupposes an unduly stringent separation between professional reason and popular values. . . . [It] is both real and
suffused with ambiguity and uncertainty.” Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel,
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1474
(2007).
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Against this background, this Note seeks to deepen our
understanding of the origins and various uses of the term
swing voter as applied to Supreme Court Justices. By detailing
swing voter’s etymological history and transformation in legal
and non-legal contexts, this Note acknowledges that swing voter’s meaning is not as straightforward as initially assumed, especially when the term is employed in the Supreme Court context. By deploying an etymological analysis and intellectual
history, crucial tools in helping us understand and apply contested concepts and meanings, this Note seeks to discover (or
perhaps reclaim) the true meaning of “swing voter” and “swing
12
Justice” as it relates to Supreme Court Justices. To accomplish this goal, Part I begins by tracing the history of “swing
voter” back to its origins in the term swingman, connecting the
terms and mapping their transition into well-known descriptors for particular Supreme Court Justices. Part II identifies and examines five individual examples of Justices historically identified as swing voters, swing Justices, or median
Justices in an effort to show why each Justice fits a different
13
iteration of the swing voter mold. Part III explains the normative implications of this failure to define what it means to be a
swing voter, swing Justice, or median Justice, including conceptual confusion for academics from several disciplines who
use all the terms to describe the same or different Justices;
public confusion about what a swing Justice actually is; and the
lack of a true distinction between law and politics.
I. FROM SWINGMAN TO SWING VOTER: MAPPING THE
CONVERGENCE OF THE TERMS AS DESCRIPTORS FOR
JUSTICES ON THE SUPREME COURT
To fully understand the present day definition of swing
voter, it is necessary to map out the evolution of the term from
its origins as “swingman” all the way to its many uses today,
where it is now often used interchangeably with “median Justice.” Section A tracks the history of the term swingman, with
its eclectic assortment of uses, attempting to pinpoint its vari-

12. For an amusing contemporary explanation of why etymologies are important with examples, see Cristina Gusano, An Introduction to Etymology:
Eight Great Word Origins, BABBEL, https://www.babbel.com/en/magazine/an
-introduction-to-etymology-eight-great-word-origins (last visited Nov. 28,
2016).
13. Swing voter only recently ballooned in popular discourse. Thus, the
examples weigh heavily toward the Court’s contemporary eras.
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ous definitions over time. Section B hones in on the use of
swingman in reference to specific members of the Court, and
discusses, somewhat speculatively, the conversion of swingman
to swing voter in that context.
A. THE SWINGMAN: FROM RANCHES AND RAILROADS TO THE
RULE OF LAW
The precise origins of the word swingman are unclear. It
initially appeared sometime around the start of the twentieth
century—irregularly at first and then increasing progressively
over time. Regrettably, very little material exists that appears
to accurately trace the development of the term. Nonetheless,
some evidence makes it possible to trace its origin and evolution. Subsection 1 discusses the multiple dictionary definitions
of swingman over time in combination with examples from media of the period. Subsection 2 discusses swingman’s earliest
uses in reference to Supreme Court Justices.
1. Uses and Connotations Referenced in Dictionary
14
Definitions
In 1903, the first documented use of swingman, or “swingmen” in this instance, emerged in The Log of a Cowboy, to reference cowboys who would ride on the outskirts of a cattle herd,
known as “flank rider[s],” and guide lost cattle back to the
15
group. Swingman is sometimes written as “swing man”; yet,
there does not appear to be any drastic difference in meaning
16
due to spacing. As the word increased in popularity, it also became a commonplace descriptor for gifted male jazz musicians
14. See, e.g., Swingman, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1919)
[hereinafter OXFORD]. Dictionaries often lag behind popular culture in the
adoption of words. See Geoffrey Clive Williams, Art for Dictionaries’ Sake:
Comparing Cultural Outlooks Through Dictionaries and Corpora, in ENGLISH
DICTIONARIES AS CULTURAL MINES 175 (Roberta Facchinetti ed., 2012) (“[T]he
senses found in a dictionary are not necessarily those that predominate in current usage.”). Dictionaries are “much better on range and variation than on
connection and interaction.” RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY
OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 19 (1983). Because of this, dictionary definitions are
not always the best resources to identify and evaluate evolving terms.
15. ANDY ADAMS, THE LOG OF A COWBOY 25 (1903) (“The main body of the
herd trailed along behind the leaders . . . guarded by outriders, known as
swing men.” (emphasis added)); see also PHILIP ASHTON ROLLINS, THE COWBOY: HIS CHARACTERISTICS, HIS EQUIPMENT, AND HIS PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST 253 (1922).
16. See, e.g., JOHN PITT, USA BY RAIL: PLUS CANADA’S MAIN ROUTES 289
(8th ed. 2012) (illustrating that both swingman and “swing man” were used to
describe the third brakeman on the railroad).
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who played swing music, popular from about 1935 to 1946.
These men were admired in their communities and honored for
18
their lively musical talent and performance abilities. During
the latter portion of this time period, the media began to use
swingman to describe active government leaders who aspired to
achieve certain goals or obtain specific positions as well as
those that “maintain[ed] a fair balance between different points
19
of view.” In 1944, swingman was also employed in the aviation
20
context to describe a “jack of all trades.”
Beginning in the late 1960s, the “jack of all trades” definition might have led to the use of swingman as slang for multifaceted players in sports, describing a man adept in multiple
21
positions. The swingman in sports was the most versatile man
22
on the court, field, course, or in the ring. Swingman has always been an inherently gendered term, used primarily to de17. See RAY B. BROWNE & PAT BROWNE, THE GUIDE TO UNITED STATES
POPULAR CULTURE 333 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Biography, BENNY GOODMAN: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE
KING OF SWING, http://www.bennygoodman.com/about/biography.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2016); see also Angelynn Grant, The Golden Age of Jazz Covers, ANGELYNN GRANT DESIGN, http://angelynngrant.com/the-golden-age-of
-jazz-covers-the-golden-age-of-jazz-covers (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (quoting
James Flora describing Benny Goodman as “one of the great ones as a swing
man” (emphasis added)).
19. Paul M. Herzog, Dean at Harvard; Headed N.L.R.B. Under Truman,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1986, at D27 [hereinafter Herzog]; see, e.g., Robert C. Albright, Michigan Leader Sets Sights on Two Main Senate Posts, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 1946, at 1.
20. William W. Prescott, Accepted: One Fortress, FLYING, Dec. 1944, at 50,
51.
21. See Phil Elderkin, Knicks Playoff Material?: Playoff Basketball
Stallworth ‘Swingman’ Free Ride Offers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22,
1965, at 13; Thomas Faces Joe’s Guns: Minnesota Farmer Opposes Louis in
Title Bout Tonight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1938, at A13 (using swingman in boxing context). Following the evolution to the present day in the sports context,
swingman appeared in a few other random places in the 1970s: in literature to
describe individuals involved in the drug trade, particularly drug dealers, and
to define emerging revolutionary leaders in Latin American coup d’états. See
JOHN WAINWRIGHT, HIGH-CLASS KILL 157 (1973) (“Tell us about the dope he
pushed . . . . He was taking from his swingman.” (emphasis added)); see also
Martin C. Needler, Military Intervention in Latin America, in THE MILITARY
AND MODERNIZATION 89–90 (Henry Bienen ed., 2009).
22. This remains the case today. See Andrew Capel, Good News for Adelaide as Versatile Swingman Andy Otten Nears Return, HERALD SUN (June 28,
2015), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/teams/adelaide/good-news-for
-adelaide-as-versatile-swingman-andy-otten-nears-return/news-story/6f1852b0
20fbc0d1b55c30edf6b9d173; Rusty Simmons, Versatile Swingman Iguodala ‘A
Step Ahead of Everybody,’ SF GATE (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/
warriors/article/versatile-swingman-iguodala-a-step-ahead-of-6205212.php.
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23

scribe men of athletic achievement and ability. Today, this use
24
of swingman is still the most common, if not its sole use.
Despite dictionaries’ extensive chronicling of uses for
swingman across decades, they fail to mention one of swingman’s most subtly relevant uses for the purposes of this Note:
25
the title for a third brakeman on a railroad car. Overall, the
imagery of such a position on the railroad was positive. The
railroad swingman played an essential role in keeping train
26
travel safe. The swingman’s purpose was to keep the railroad
27
functional. He played an important role in the maintenance
28
and healthy operations of the system as a whole. Foreshadowing the swingman’s role on the Supreme Court, the swingmen
of the railroads mediated feuds between the conductor and en29
gineer. This understanding of the swingman—as an intermediary between two potentially opposing parties—seems to be
applicable more generally to situations that arise on commit30
tees, boards, and most importantly, appellate benches.

23. See supra notes 21–22.
24. Swingman is the name of a popular Nike baseball collection. See Austin Boykins, Swing for the Fences with the Nike Swingman Collection,
SNEAKERWATCH (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.sneakerwatch.com/article/029796/
swing-for-the-fences-with-the-nike-swingman-collection. Swingman is most
often used to describe versatile basketball players. See, e.g., James Herbert,
Report: Blazers, Veteran Swingman Mike Miller Agree on a Buyout, CBS
SPORTS (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/eye-on-basketball/
25319053/report-blazers-mike-miller-agree-on-a-buyout.
25. See PITT, supra note 16. Several solicitations for male railway workers, including swingmen, are listed in the classifieds of the early years of this
period. See, e.g., Classified Ad 22, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 4, 1945, at 32; see also Classified Ad 5, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1944.
26. In 1949, the Supreme Court itself addressed the role of a swingman on
the railroad in Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway. Co., 338 U.S.
430, 431 (1949).
27. See Rrboomer, Comment to What is a “Swingman,” What is His Job,
and Why Did He Ride the Roof?, CLASSIC TRAINS MAG. (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:25
PM), http://cs.trains.com/ctr/f/3/t/198874.aspx (explaining the role of a swingman); see also Negro Rail Firemen Lose on Job Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1960, at 7 (discussing a discrimination controversy involving the swingman
position); Sparks from the Rail: Winston’s Spicy Gossip of Men and Events in
the Railroad World, CHI. DEFENDER, Apr. 26, 1913, at 7 (publicizing Mr. John
Fite’s new role as “swing man”).
28. See Rrboomer, supra note 27.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Robert Doherty, Court Gives Approval to Morse Pact: 6 to 5
Management Edge Possible, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 17, 1957, at C9; Herzog,
supra note 19; Laura A. Kiernan, McGowan Is Named Chief Appeals Judge,
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1981, at F1.
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2. Earliest Mentions of the Swingman on the Supreme Court
The search for the first use of swingman in the judicial
context is imperfect, and there is a possibility that earlier uses
31
exist. Yet, based on near duplicate prints of an article by
newspaper reporter Frank R. Kent, it is clear that the swing32
man in the Supreme Court context appeared as early as 1937.
Each version of Kent’s article identifies Justice Owen Roberts
as the Justice “in the position of ‘swing man’ upon whose whim
all decisions depend” because he was the fifth vote in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a decision more infamous for its under33
lying political implications than for its holding. Some historians recount Roberts’ vote in Parrish as a strategic politically
motivated switch in support of New Deal legislation and a de34
parture from his previously conservative voting choices. These
historians speculate that Roberts swung his vote to deliberately
prevent President Roosevelt’s threat to add more Justices to
35
the Supreme Court from coming to fruition.
Kent’s article only identifies a swingman in a single decision. The first use of swingman to describe the overall decisionmaking style and impact of a specific Justice, however, ap36
peared later in a January 1947 issue of Fortune magazine.
The article, written by Arthur Schlesinger, classifies the mem37
bers of the Supreme Court based on their individual beliefs.
Sandwiched between Schlesinger’s “judicial activists” and
“champions of self-restraint,” are two Justices, Chief Justice
Fred Vinson and Justice Stanley Reed, who Schlesinger de38
scribes as the “balance of power.” Although both men are apparently the “balance of power,” only Reed is labeled as the
31. Some newspapers from earlier decades remaining offline, and search
engines provide only limited additional resources. Further research may lead
to even earlier uses.
32. Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1937,
at 4 [hereinafter Great Game I ]; Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics:
“Their Reluctance Increased,” WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1937, at 4 [hereinafter
Great Game II ].
33. 300 U.S. 379, 398–400 (1937) (emphasis added) (upholding Washington’s minimum wage law); Great Game I, supra note 32; Great Game II, supra
note 32.
34. E.g., Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save
Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 70–71 (2010).
35. See id. President Roosevelt based his threat on public discontent with
the perceived splitting and stalemating of the Court.
36. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan.
1947, at 73.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 74–78.
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39

“swing.” Schlesinger writes that Reed’s “position as swing
man makes him the object of special solicitude on the part of
40
his brethren as well as of the lawyers before the court.” To
color Reed’s characterization as the swingman, Schlesinger also
describes him as the “center of the ideological controversy” and
41
“the key man.”
Only two years later, swingman appeared even more prominently in a 1949 Stanford Law Review article that questioned
42
the characterization, role, and impact of Justice Reed. The author sought to “present a limited analysis of the common view
that [Reed was] the swing man on the present Supreme
43
Court.” Reed’s central position in defining the majority for
specific kinds of labor and trade regulation cases likely prompt44
ed this swingman analysis. The author questions Reed’s generalized role as the swingman, basing this judgment on the
sway of Reed’s votes in cases addressing specific issues versus
45
his decision-making practices as a whole. This article, which
focused on an overall analysis of Reed’s voting practices and
emphasized his collective voting pattern, compared to Kent’s
discussion of Roberts’ singular “swing” vote in Parrish, solidified Reed as the first officially labeled swingman of the Supreme Court.
B. FROM SWINGMAN TO SWING VOTER
The transition from swingman to swing voter is murky
46
and, at times, confusing. Subsection 1 begins with a survey of
legal, political, and layman’s dictionaries in search of clues as
to when swingman evolved to swing voter. Subsection 2 addresses the development of the term swing voter as a descriptor
for a subset of voters in the general populace.

39. Id. at 78. This raises questions as to whether the Chief Justice can ever be the swingman.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Mr. Justice Reed—Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN. L. REV. 714 (1949)
[hereinafter Mr. Justice Reed].
43. Id. at 715.
44. See id. at 728; see, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495 (1948).
45. Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 728–29.
46. Swingman/Swing Voter, YURI DOLGOPOLOV, A DICTIONARY OF CONFUSABLE PHRASES: MORE THAN 10,000 IDIOMS AND COLLOCATIONS 311 (2010).
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1. The Legal, Political, and Layman’s Definitions
Swingman’s general definition listed in both the Oxford
47
English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary lack
48
reference to swingman’s use in the judicial context entirely.
Surprisingly, Merriam-Webster does not have a separate entry
for swing voter, but merely recognizes the term as a derivative
49
of the word “swing.” Additionally, the Oxford English Dictionary acknowledges swing voter’s use in contexts outside of the
polling electorate only in passing, providing “also, a casting
50
voter” as an alternative definition. On the other hand, legal
and political dictionaries merely contain the definition for
“swing vote(r),” leaving swingman entirely absent from their
51
pages.
In the legal realm, “swing vote” appeared as an entry in
the second edition of A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage in
52
1995. Even then, the single definition it did provide applies
solely to the term’s use in the judicial context: “An appellate
judge’s vote that determines an issue on which the other judges
53
are evenly split.” A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage offers
O’Connor as an example of a swing voter, citing a 1989
54
Newsweek article. Black’s Law Dictionary provided a definition for swing vote for the first time in 1999, implicitly suggesting that the phrase may have been considered slang up until
55
that time. Political dictionaries seem to have a similar lag
56
time. The length of this lag was actually quite long since
47. See supra Part I.A.1.
48. See Swingman, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2003) [hereinafter MERRIAM] (“A player capable of playing effectively in
two different positions and esp. of playing both guard and forward on a basketball team.”); see also OXFORD, supra note 14.
49. But, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary does contain an entry for swingman. See MERRIAM, supra note 48.
50. OXFORD, supra note 14.
51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999); GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF
LEGAL USAGE (3d ed. 2011); KATHLEEN THOMPSON HILL & GERALD N. HILL,
REAL LIFE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT THEY’RE SAYING AND
WHAT IT REALLY MEANS 267–68 (1994).
52. Swing Vote, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 1995).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also George Hackett & Ann McDaniel, All Eyes on Justice
O’Connor, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 34.
55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 51 (“Swing vote. The vote that
determines an issue when all other voting parties, such as appellate judges,
are evenly split.”).
56. See HILL & HILL, supra note 51 (publishing an edition with a “swing
vote” entry in 1994).
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swing voter appeared nearly three decades earlier in a 1966 issue of The Economist, describing a legislative committee mem57
ber’s voting patterns. Simultaneously, swingman solidified itself in the sports world and its other meanings lost cultural
58
relevance. This left swing voter to eventually become the
commonplace descriptor for influential voters in the electorate
and pivotal Justices on the Supreme Court, finally appearing in
59
legal dictionaries after decades of use in popular discourse.
2. Distinguishing the Electoral Swing Voter
Unlike swingman, which has had its definitions pared
down to a sole use in the sports context, swing voter has consistently retained two popular uses in the electoral and judicial
60
contexts. Swing voter is often used to define particular blocs of
the electorate, typically an independent or floating voter that
61
might not be tied to a political party. At first glance, the use of
swing voter in the electoral context would seem to be closely
connected to the use of swing voter in reference to the Supreme
Court. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the use of swing voter to
describe a group in the electorate likely originated inde62
pendently of its judicial counterpart.
Political parties of the eighteenth century asked the public
63
to vote for their “ticket.” In the late nineteenth century, the
idea of a “split ticket” enticed certain voters “across party
57. Feeling for the Brake, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1966, at 898, 898 (“He is
expected to join Mr. Daane as a ‘swing voter,’ leaving Mr. Martin with only
one conservative colleague . . . .”).
58. See MERRIAM, supra note 48.
59. Swing music faded in popularity and the rise of automobiles and
planes made train travel less common, leading to the waning relevance of the
swingman in these contexts and in public conversation. See The Decline of Rail
Travel: Three Decades of Turmoil, AMERICANRAILS.COM, http://www.american
-rails.com/decline.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2016); Swing, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/swing (last modified
Nov. 9, 2015).
60. Although there are documented uses of swingman in the electoral context, it is now essentially obsolete in this context. See, e.g., Electoral Sabotage,
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1960, at A14 (“Southern states may bid for a swing-man
role in the presidential election.”).
61. See generally LINDA KILLIAN, THE SWING VOTE: THE UNTAPPED POWER OF INDEPENDENTS (2012) (examining the role of independent and swing
voters in modern elections).
62. See DAVID K. BARNHART & ALLAN A. METCALF, AMERICA IN SO MANY
WORDS: WORDS THAT HAVE SHAPED AMERICA 260 (1997).
63. Id. (entire word capitalized in original source); see also Ticket,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“A list of candidates for nomination or election.”).
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64

lines.” But, it was not until the 1964 presidential election that
the moderate voters who emerged out of the Republican Party
and elected Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency were referred
65
to as a “swing voter” bloc. Electoral swing voters have been
66
described as “ambivalent” or “cross-pressured.” Typically the
target of study for political strategists in presidential campaigns, swing voters “are especially concentrated in swing
67
states.” Swing states are a relatively recent and distinct phenomenon, first heavily discussed in media reports covering the
68
2000 presidential election. Just as swing voter is used interchangeably, despite the term’s different connotations, swing
state is (arguably, inconsistently) equated with battleground
states, bellwethers, or in reference to states where polls suggest
69
competitive elections.
As the driving force in presidential elections, swing voters
70
create swing states. Swing voters within a state are identified
64. BARNART & METCALF, supra note 62; see also Split Ticket, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“A ballot cast by a voter
who votes for candidates of more than one party.”).
65. BARNART & METCALF, supra note 62, at 260–61. Some scholars have
connected the use of the term in the electorate to the simultaneous use of
“swing,” or more accurately “swinger,” as a descriptor for people who switch
sexual partners. Id. at 261 (“Perhaps there was a hint of sexiness in being a
swing voter, even if not a swinging one.”). The act of engaging in “group sex” or
“mate swapping” is known as “swinging.” LAWRENCE R. SAMUEL, SEXIDEMIC:
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF SEX IN AMERICA 96 (2013); see also GILBERT D.
BARTELL, GROUP SEX: A SCIENTIST’S EYEWITNESS REPORT ON THE AMERICAN
WAY OF SWINGING (1971) (researching the unique sexual practices of “swingers” in the 1960s).
66. WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE SWING VOTER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2
(2008).
67. Stacy Hunter Hecht & David Schultz, Introduction: Swing States and
Presidential Elections, in PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MATTER xxi (Stacy Hunter Hecht & David Schultz eds., 2015) (citing LINDA
KILLIAN, THE UNTAPPED POWER OF INDEPENDENTS (2011)); see also Gerald F.
Seib, Who Will Be the Swing Voters in 2016?, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/who-will-be-the-swing-voters-in-2016-1432574507.
68. Hecht & Schultz, supra note 67, at xiii; see also Darshan J. Goux, The
Battleground State: Conceptualizing Geographic Contestation in American
Presidential Elections, 1960-2004, at 17 (Spring 2010) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Univ. Cal. Berkeley), http://eprints.org/uc/item/8dp32778 (stating
that swing state was mentioned as early as 1936 four times in the New York
Times but increased in popularity only in recent years).
69. See Hecht & Schultz, supra note 67, at xiv, xvi (“[I]t is clear from these
few definitions, as well as others provided by journalists and pop culture references, the concept swing state is not precisely defined.”); see also ALEX
THOMSON, A GLOSSARY OF U.S. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 168 (2007) (defining swing state as a state with no dominant political party).
70. See KILLIAN, supra note 61, at 17 (noting that when swing voters re-
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71

and defined by demographics. Thus, significant alterations in
72
the demographics of a region make or break a swing state.
But, demographics are just the beginning to a more in-depth
analysis involving ideology, socioeconomic variables, and even
73
the median voter theorem. The rhetoric in this context is intense and complicated, but the most intriguing aspect is how
identical it is to the rhetoric about swing voters on the Supreme
74
Court. This simultaneous use begs an analysis of the implications for the Supreme Court, and more broadly, the rule of law.
C. SWING VOTER, SWING JUSTICE, AND MEDIAN JUSTICE
Prior to identifying and discussing specific Justices, this
Note seeks to consider the application of the median voter theorem to the Supreme Court, known as the median Justice theo75
rem, and how that application interacts with the use of swing
voter and swing Justice.
The median Justice is “the Justice in the middle of a dis76
tribution of Justices.” This is a spin on the median voter theo77
rem. The theorem posits that the median Justice of the Court
78
“controls the content” of majority opinions.

side in a state that also oscillates between Democrat and Republican, the
swing voters are particularly important).
71. See, e.g., Wesley McCune, Farmers in Politics, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. SOC. SCI. 41, 42 (1958) (“The farm vote as a whole is a swing vote, changing relatively easily . . . .”).
72. See AMERICA’S NEW SWING REGION: CHANGING POLITICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS IN THE MOUNTAIN WEST 147 (Ruy Teixeira ed., 2012).
73. See Hecht & Schultz, supra note 67, at xxiii–iv (detailing methods including asking about feelings toward the two parties, actual voting in presidential elections, and demographic variables).
74. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 66, at 20 (“[I]t is the swing voter who controls the balance of power in elections.”).
75. Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2005) (“Social scientists . . . tend to
use . . . the ‘median’ Justice, that is, the Justice in the middle of a distribution
of Justices, such that (in an ideological distribution, for example) half the Justices are to the right of (more ‘conservative’ than) the median and half are to
the left of (more ‘liberal’ than) the median.”).
76. Id.
77. For an introduction to how median voter theorem is applied to the Supreme Court, see VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT:
HOW JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 152–55
(2007); Martin et al., supra note 75, at 1280–83 (detailing the role of the median Justice in the voting patterns of Justices in sex discrimination cases).
78. See generally Cliff Carrubba et al., Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 400 (2012).
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Since the method of identifying the median Justice is more
than a bit ambiguous, legal commentators and researchers
alike have attempted to identify the median Justice using a
plethora of descriptors including the “center of the Court,” the
Court’s “middle,” the “swing” Justice, the “pivotal” Justice, and
79
“the most powerful Justice.” Although most social scientists
tend to exclusively use the term “median” to identify the crucial
80
Justice, confusion remains as other social and political scientists, commentators, researchers, advocates, and even members
81
of Congress equate the swing Justice with the median Justice.
This equation imports all sorts of assumptions that simply do
not track the historic use of either term and perpetuates the
improper use of swing voter in such a context, leading to further obfuscation of all three terms and their modern uses.
There are several kinds of pivotal Justices on the Supreme
Court. Whether a Justice is described as a swing voter, swing
Justice, or median Justice carries differing implications. These
words designate very specific kinds of actors, serving various
purposes and inhabiting different roles on the Court. Conceptually, the median Justice is a phenomenon of social and political science, rooted in a foundation of statistical voting patterns
and placement on an ideological spectrum. On the other hand,
the swing Justice is typically unpredictable, not easily cabined
by a standard voting pattern or ideological label. Further,
swing voter is continually, and perhaps inappropriately, employed in the Supreme Court context when there is a strong argument that it should be relegated only to its electoral uses.
One Justice can certainly carry all of these labels and inhabit
all of these roles at one or several times; however, the distinctions are important and imply very different things about who
a Justice is on the bench.

79. Martin et al., supra note 75.
80. See id.; see also Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying
the Median Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling:
Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 57 (2002) (stating their intention to identify the Court’s median).
81. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 37, 44–45 (describing how the term “median Justice” is used in both public and congressional discourse).
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II. WHO IS A SWING VOTER, SWING JUSTICE, OR
MEDIAN JUSTICE AND WHY?
The confines of this Note only allow for a thorough analysis
of five Justices typically identified as swing voters, or some iteration thereof. When thinking about which Justices are labeled as such, the connotations have repeatedly shifted to take
on new meanings, depending on the Justice, time period, and
intended use of the descriptor. This Part uses five Justices as
illustrative case studies, showing how the use of swing voter, or
some iteration thereof, to define each Justice fails to capture all
of the nuances of each Justice’s individual characterization.
The use of one term to describe each of these five Justices fails
to encapsulate who each Justice was and how they did their
work on the bench.
Section A analyzes the characterization of Reed as the first
identified swingman in the late 1940s, translating to a modern
mixture of both the swing Justice and the median Justice. Section B focuses on the characterization of the “moderate” median
Justices of the 1970s, White and Powell. Section C addresses a
portion of O’Connor’s tenure from 1993 to 2005, when she
served as the first female swing voter on the Court. Section D
brings the analysis into the present with Kennedy, the modern
swing Justice from 2005 to present day.
A. JUSTICE STANLEY REED: THE FIRST SWINGMAN
This Section discusses Reed’s characterization as the first
Supreme Court swingman within the developing legal and political setting of the late 1940s, translating into a combination
of swing Justice and median Justice. Reed is identified as the
first swingman instead of Owen Roberts because of Reed’s consistent characterization over an extended period of time, in82
stead of just in a singular case. It is important to contextualize Reed’s characterization within the social and political
movements of the time period. Thus, Subsection 1 will provide
a brief description to set the scene within which Reed emerged
as the first swingman of the Court. Subsection 2 will then explain that being a swingman meant, embodying attributes of
both the Supreme Court swing Justice and median Justice
roles, depending on the issue at hand and under the influence
of social change and theory feuds.

82. See infra Part I.A.2.
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1. The New Deal with the Supreme Court
In the early days of the republic, the Supreme Court
worked internally to develop decision-making norms and externally to establish the judiciary’s role in American society. Chief
Justice John Marshall played a primary role in shaping each of
83
these pursuits. Perhaps the most cogent example of this is
Marbury v. Madison, the unanimous 1803 decision establishing
84
judicial review. As Chief Justice, Marshall nearly singlehandedly pushed his colleagues to unanimity in the interests of nationalizing the law, strengthening the powers of the federal ju85
diciary, and setting precedents for future Courts.
During the Lochner-era (1897–1937), the Supreme Court
employed foundational practices laid down by Marshall to
emerge as the institution charged with upholding the rule of
86
law as a concept over and above politics. The Court depicted
the law as a last legal monument, preventing socialism from
87
destroying democracy, capitalism, and liberal legal thought.
Simultaneously, the Progressive Movement (1890–1920)
brought about state-administered socialist structures as a re88
hearsal for the New Deal. Progressivism, as a legal and politi83. See KENT R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 72
(1985) (describing Marshall as a “quiet statesm[a]n”).
84. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review under Article III of the
United States Constitution).
85. See NEWMYER, supra note 83, at 79 (discussing the “working unity of
the Court” and the Marshall Court’s “firm nationalist determination to expand
the powers of Congress”). The Marshall Court looked, interacted, and operated
quite differently than the Supreme Court of 2017. Today’s Justices no longer
live in a boardinghouse; there are nine Justices instead of six, three of whom
are women; and the racial composition is more varied. The Current Court, THE
SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://supremecourthistory.org/history
-of-the-court (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Compared to the Marshall Court,
however, present-day unanimous opinions or “opinions of the Court” are rare.
See, e.g., Stat Pack for the October Term 2014: Unanimity, SCOTUSBLOG STAT
PACK 19 (June 30, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/SB_Stat_Pack__OT14.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (providing statistics of different types of unanimity in the October 2014 term).
86. The Lochner-era began with the Supreme Court’s decision in Allgeyer
v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) and ended with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). During this time period, the Supreme Court used
substantive due process to strike down many laws, acting like a board of censors in some sense. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
87. But see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 232–302 (1942) (positing that the “intellectual class” will fundamentally contribute to capitalism’s demise by appointing politicians and judges
that are not good administrators).
88. E.g., Progressivism and the Wisconsin Idea, WISCONSIN HISTORICAL
SOCIETY, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/turningpoints/tp-036/?action=more_

MCGAVER_MLR

2017]

1/25/2017 8:06 PM

SWING VOTER ON THE SUPREME COURT

1263

cal movement, pushed on the neutrality of the rule of law and
89
its independence as a legal perspective. It specifically challenged the bias of the rule of law’s human administrators, in90
cluding judges, lawyers, clerks, and their elite viewpoints.
A feud erupted over the law-politics distinction, spearheaded by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and the legal real91
ists. Legal realism is a school of thought that challenges the
idea that legal reasoning is separate and autonomous from pol92
itics and society. Roosevelt’s New Deal and its ensuing litigation engaged the legal realist philosophy by actively taking legal concepts, operationalizing them, and dealing with the law
pragmatically by substantially involving the federal govern93
ment in the economy. In 1937, towards the end of New Deal
implementation, the Court struggled to maintain a unified ap94
pearance and externalized its divisiveness. In response, Rooessay (last visited Nov. 28, 2016); see Thomas G. West & William A.
Schambra, The Progressive Movement and the Transformation of American
Politics, HERITAGE (July 18, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2007/07/the-progressive-movement-and-the-transformation-of-american
-politics (“Progressivism was a reform movement that ran from the late 19th
century through the first decades of the 20th century . . . .”).
89. See JOHN D. BLUENKER ET AL., PROGRESSIVISM 3–21 (1986).
90. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 10 (1963) (“There is
no hypocrisy. The lawyers’ pretenses are not consciously deceptive. The lawyers, themselves, like the laymen, fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic
and mutable character of law.”); see also TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE
MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW
CLERK 206–12 (2006) (providing a brief history of the role and relationship of
law clerks to the Supreme Court).
91. Holmes and his fellow legal realists acted as iconoclast reformers, attacking the cherished law-politics distinction. Jerome Frank, a famous legal
realist, criticized “the basic legal myth” of “the Father-as-Infallible-Judge,”
proposing that the “desire [for] certainty in law is to indulge in a childhood
fantasy.” Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 18
J.L. & SOC’Y 175, 182 (1991) (quoting FRANK, supra note 90, at 19); see also
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 129–63 (1985) (examining Frank’s legal realism on
the bench). For more information on the life and legacy of Holmes, see G.
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF (1993).
92. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 193 (1992).
93. See The Progressive Era’s Legacy: FDR’s New Deal, DISCOVER THE
NETWORKS, http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/viewSubCategory.asp?id=
1228 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (mentioning FDR’s dictator-like power in instituting economic programs during the Great Depression).
94. See Samuel D. Thurman, Jr., The Coming Test of the Supreme Court,
22 J. ST. B. CAL. 21, 21 (1947) (“The present [Vinson] court . . . [is] the most
badly divided court in American history.”).
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95

sevelt proposed a plan to “pack the Court.” The plan “would
have added a Justice to the court as sitting Justices reached
96
the age of 70 without retiring.” This proposal prompted Roberts’ infamous “switch in time [that] saved nine,” and the plan
97
never made it past the Senate.
In 1947, ten years after the New Deal’s adoption, the Court
was tasked with handling the influx of New Deal litigation as a
result of poor legislative draftsmanship, even though no one
98
Justice could boast more than ten years of service. As it overturned or slowly chipped away at precedents, critics accused
the Court of lacking objectivity and weakening the doctrine of
99
stare decisis. The external discord combined with the weak
leadership of then-Chief Justice Vinson set the stage for the
100
emergence of the Court’s first swingman, Reed.
2. Reed: The Court’s First Swingman
Reed, a former government lawyer that had “vainly [argued] many of the early New Deal measures before the Supreme Court,” accepted President Roosevelt’s nomination in
101
102
1938. The Senate rapidly confirmed his appointment. Reed
was simultaneously described as occupying a “central position
103
on the Bench” and as “a figure of great influence,” bolstering

95. JEFF SHESOL,
PREME COURT 3 (2010)

SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SU(addressing the context surrounding Roosevelt’s plan).
96. Walter Trohan, Reed Becomes Top Dissenter of High Court, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., June 12, 1955, at 34.
97. SHESOL, supra note 95, at 434 (alteration in original); id. at 429–43
(narrating the aftermath of Supreme Court decisions regarding the Wagner
Act and their impact on Roosevelt); see also infra Part I.A.2.
98. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS,
AND LEGACY 4 (2001) (noting the large amount of legislation and its “sloppy”
quality); Thurman, supra note 94, at 32 (commenting that one-hundred percent of the Justices were appointed in the last ten years).
99. See Thurman, supra note 94, at 22.
100. See UROFSKY, supra note 98, at 29 (“A weak chief . . . Frederick M.
Vinson—can often find himself stymied . . . and end up doing little more than
presiding over a judicial battlefield.”).
101. See id. at 32; Thurman, supra note 94, at 32.
102. Senate Quickly Confirms Reed Nomination: New Justice Is Expected
To Sit Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1938, at 4; see also John P. Frank, The
Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: III, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 461, 505 (“Confirmation of Stanley Reed . . . was more in the nature of an accolade than an
investigation.”).
103. John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947–1948, 16 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1948); see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Supreme Court:
1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 73, 78 (“Reed[’s] . . . position as swing man
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his dual characterization as swing Justice and median Justice.
As early as 1947, commentators identified Reed as swingman of
the Court: “A solid moderate whose opinions have seemed more
104
rooted in the case at hand than in any leanings, left or right.”
Reed’s “moderate” nonideological position seemed to place him
square in the middle of the bench, much like a median Jus105
tice. But being swingman for Reed did not imply an active
mediating position; rather, it meant a passive tipping of the
106
scales in equally split disputes. This scale tipping sounds
more like the role a swing Justice would play in any given case.
Reed’s dual characterization displays a desire by academics and
the public to discuss the particularities of Reed’s role, but confusion about the proper way to characterize the fluidity of his
position. Despite his seeming importance, Reed was a relatively
107
inconspicuous man in most contexts. Nevertheless, his vote
remained crucial in marginal cases. Between 1945 and 1950,
the Court released 112 five-to-four/four-to-three decisions out of
108
725 total opinions. Reed appeared in the majority in eighty109
one of these decisions, or 72.3 percent of the time. Whether
Reed was playing ideological median of passive scale-tipper on
any given case did not change the fact that his vote was unpredictable and desirable to both factions on the Court.
Notwithstanding the numbers, the generalized description
of Reed as swingman and the lack of a precise definition for the
term produced some doubt at the time. This prompted a study
makes him the object of special solicitude on the part of brethren as well as of
the lawyers before the Court.”).
104. Justice Reed Retires, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1957, at 22; see
also Thurman, supra note 94, at 32 (“An assiduous steering of a middle course
has made his vote most frequently the deciding one in five-to-four decisions.”).
105. Id.
106. Justice Reed Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1957, at 19 (“During
these turbulent years he has evolved from ardent advocate of the New Deal
laws to one of the more conservative group on the Supreme Court bench. And,
between times, he was ‘swing man’ of the court whose opinions in close decisions would tip the scales one way or the other.”); The Spinning Spectrum,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1957, at 12 (noting many five-to-four decisions).
107. See Thurman, supra note 94, at 32 (“Reed [is] the least colorful member of the group . . . .”).
108. The figures cited were determined using raw data compiled by THE
SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016). From that raw data, the author identified one-vote
decisions, be it five-to-four or four-to-three, over the period cited. The author
then reviewed each decision to determine whether the Justice fell within the
majority or minority. Finally, the author compiled case-specific information so
that the Term could be thoroughly examined.
109. Id.
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of his voting patterns in particular issue areas, leading to the
110
proposition that his vote was not always crucial. The study’s
conclusions accurately predicted Reed’s later tendency towards
the conservative bloc, noting his votes were “considerably more
111
often” detrimental to the liberal wing’s position. It could also
be the case that Reed became the Court’s swingman based on
his voting pattern, or lack thereof, in certain types of cases,
specifically matters involving trade regulation and labor is112
sues. Although some doubt may have existed about a generalized swingman label for Reed throughout his entire time on the
Court, his identification as the first swingman of the Court on
issues of trade regulation and labor between 1945 and 1950
went unchallenged.
As is the case with every Justice identified as pivotal,
Reed’s identity as swingman depended entirely on an equal
split amongst his brethren. Whether Reed embodied the characteristics of a swing Justice or median Justice at any given
point was meaningless without a four-to-four split between the
other Justices. Without an equal division, Reed’s vote would be
no more remarkable than that of any other Justice.
B. JUSTICE BYRON WHITE AND JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: THE
MEDIAN JUSTICES OF THE 1970S
This Section explores the identification of White and Powell as swing voters in the 1970s, since each man was identified
113
as a pivotal player on the Burger Court. Subsection 1 contextualizes the characterizations of both Justices within the
broader framework of the resurgence of the idea of an objective
rule of law and its continued tension with the legal realist
movement. Subsection 2 posits the question whether White and
Powell occupied the ideological middle of the Court or simply
114
adhered to an unchanging individualized judicial philosophy.
110. See Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 729 (suggesting that future
statistical work should assess if Reed’s vote truly was crucial).
111. Id. at 719, 722.
112. See id. at 728; see also Robert C. Barnard & Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Patents, Procedure and the Sherman Act—The Supreme Court and a Competitive
Economy, 1947 Term, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1948) (providing a table
of opinions broken down by Justice in trade regulation cases in the 1947
Term).
113. For background on the Burger Court, see TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH,
THE BURGER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 3 (2000).
114. See Lance Liebman, Swing Man on the Supreme Court: The Court Is
in Two Factions Now and Justice White Is in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1972, at SM17; see also Linda Greenhouse, Byron R. White, Longtime Justice
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Regardless, based on the public perceptions and actual statistics of decision-making during the majority of their terms,
White and Powell’s roles as swingmen make them look more
like median Justices than swing Justices.
1. The Resurgence of the Rule of Law
President Eisenhower nominated Earl Warren for Chief
115
Justice of the Supreme Court in 1953. Often compared to
John Marshall, the “Superchief” was known for his unique
116
“ethicist” approach to controversy. When Burger succeeded
Warren as Chief Justice in 1969, this approach, perceived by
some as judicial activism, produced a belated backlash to legal
117
realism. This backlash birthed an “extremist” version of legal
realism: adhering to the maxim that “all law is politics” instead
of the earlier Holmes and Frank version that “all law is poli118
cy.” Critics, spurred by perceptions of the judiciary’s unchained policymaking, advocated for a return to objectivity, the
119
rule of law, and neutrality in judicial decision-making.
Burger valued the formalities of the Court over its more
120
pragmatic functions. This leadership style, however, alienated other Justices and stifled the potential for a compromising,
121
collegial, and united Court. This is illustrated by the fact that
Justice Potter Stewart felt estranged enough to provide inside
information about the Court and Burger to outsiders, resulting
122
in The Brethren. Burger’s favoritism for appearances and in-

and a Football Legend, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www
.nytimes.com/2002/04/16/us/byron-r-white-longtime-justice-and-a-football
-legend-dies-at-84.html?pagewanted=all (quoting former clerk, Kate Stith
Cabranes, in discussing the change in ideology of the Court while “Byron
White didn’t change”).
115. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 129–58 (1982)
(detailing the nomination).
116. UROFSKY, supra note 98, at 34, 35; see also WHITE, supra note 115, at
369 (“He . . . act[ed] . . . from his instincts for what was fair, honorable, politically feasible and sensible at the time.”).
117. Calvin Woodard, Whose Law Is It?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1990), http://
www.nytimes.com/1990/09/09/books/whose-law-is-it.html?pagewanted=all
(book review).
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Formalities meant the rituals, appearances, and administration of the
Court. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 232.
121. See id.
122. See generally BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979) (detailing an insider’s perspective of the
Supreme Court’s operation and decision-making processes).
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stitutional rituals did nothing to preserve the Court’s image as
the rule of law’s objective gatekeeper. In fact, under Burger’s
leadership, the Court’s image seemed far more political than
impartial.
The 1970s brought about a slew of socially divisive issues,
123
124
the Pentagon Papers,
the
including the Vietnam War,
125
126
death penalty, and abortion. In 1972, following the nominations of Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist, President
Nixon opined that the Court was “as balanced as [he] had an
127
opportunity to make it.” Naturally, Nixon’s perception of balance was skewed by his political ideology. This blatant attempt
by a President to manipulate the Court echoed back to the in128
teractions between Roosevelt and the split Court of 1937. Because of Nixon’s interference, the Justices of the Burger Court
frequently found themselves positioned in opposing blocs: the
four Nixon appointees in opposition to the four “survivors of the
129
Warren Court.” White, an appointee of President John F.
Kennedy, played a pivotal role in equally split cases, oftentimes
130
making a majority of five. Along with White, Powell also
emerged as a pivotal voter when he established himself as a
moderate on the Court. Powell’s tenure exceeded White’s and
continued into the 1970s, also arguably increasing his importance in divided cases. Both White and Powell, in their respective roles as ideological medians, were wedged between opposing factions on the Court with their comparatively moderate
perspectives.

123. See, e.g., Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929, 929–30 (1972) (denying certiorari due to the political nature of the request to review financial disbursements for the Vietnam War).
124. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628–29 (1972); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (deciding issues regarding the release of the Pentagon Papers).
125. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
126. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179, 185–86 (1973) (holding that a
right to abortion is rooted in the constitutional right to privacy); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expanding on this right).
127. James J. Kilpatrick, Nixon Court: On Its Way, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, July 20, 1972, at 3.
128. See supra Part II.A.1.
129. John P. MacKenzie, Justice White Swing Man in Nixon’s ‘Balanced’
Court, WASH. POST, July 3, 1972, at A2. In 1972, the four Nixon appointees
were Blackmun, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist. The four Warren Court survivors were Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart.
130. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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131

2. The 1970s’ “Moderate” Medians

As a 1946 law clerk to Vinson during Reed’s time as
swingman, Byron White came to the Court without a distinct
132
ideological label. A median Justice on the bench, White was
also a celebrated swingman on the football field, baseball dia133
mond, and basketball court. In this role, “White’s strengths
134
and weaknesses as a judge echoed his talents as an athlete.”
Throughout his career, White maintained a belief that a
“[J]ustice’s job was to decide particular cases rather than advo135
cate and pursue an overarching constitutional vision.” With
this mantra, he oftentimes became the pivotal vote in close cas136
es. Serving on the Court for over three decades, White’s peak
137
as median Justice distinctly spiked between 1971 and 1973.
During this time, out of the Court’s 539 decisions, 86 were fiveto-four or four-to-three decisions; White appeared in the majori138
ty in 62 of those 86 decisions. This amounted to being in the
139
majority of split cases 72.1 percent of the time.
The 1972 Court had two factions, and “Justice White [was]
140
in the middle.” Oftentimes stuck between the Nixon appoin131. But see William B. Schultz & Philip K. Howard, The Myth of Swing
Voting: An Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 798, 800 (1975) (“Justice White and Powell . . . aligned themselves with
members of the right voting bloc rather than acting as swing voters between
the blocs. Only Justice Stewart was a true swing voter in the aggregate of cases.”). Schultz and Howard demonstrate the dangers of conflating median Justice, swing Justice, and swing voter. Both Justices White and Powell could
have been median Justices on the Court while Stewart simultaneously played
the role of swing voter.
132. See PEPPERS, supra note 90, at 138–39 (describing White’s accolades
without mentioning any ideological orientation); Greenhouse, supra note 114
(“[N]o ideological label ever fit White comfortably.”).
133. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 67. White competitively played
pick-up basketball with his clerks in the Court’s gym, nicknamed the “highest
court in the land.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 122, at 65–66. For a
photograph of such, see PEPPERS, supra note 90, at 78.
134. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Athlete as Judge, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 505
(1999) (reviewing DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO WAS ONCE WHIZZER
WHITE (1998)).
135. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS
IMPACT AND LEGACY 38 (2007).
136. See From Triple Threat to the Bench, TIME, Apr. 6, 1962, at 24 (discussing White’s relationship with the Kennedys, which led to federal judgeship).
137. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 67 (“[White’s] tenure extended
from 1962 until his retirement in 1993.”).
138. See supra note 108.
139. Id.
140. Liebman, supra note 114.
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tees and Warren Court survivors, White maintained his label141
less existence. Preferring narrow decisions tied closely to the
facts, his judicial record is more easily examined by issue than
142
in general terms. White’s individualized judicial philosophy
and decision-making practices failed to fit neatly into any predetermined box, particularly because his decisions were not
143
considered “politically reliable.” To some, this suggested the
makings “of a new centrist faction and a new set of Court
144
themes.” Yet, White’s portrayal as the “unpredictable ‘swing’”
of the Court was not only inaccurate if distinguishing the terms
appropriately within context, but also implied that his ideology
arbitrarily swung. In reality, “there [was] nothing wishywashy
145
about Justice White.”
In the split opinions of 1972, White voted “with the conservatives more often than not” with some notable exceptions,
including nullification of the death penalty, wiretapping, and
146
representation for indigent defendants. Did White encompass
the ideological middle of the Court or did he have an independent judicial philosophy? The answer to this question seems to
be both. Not surprisingly, which Justice fits the ideological
middle of the Court depends upon the changing ideologies of
those to his left and right, sometimes pushing Stewart into the
147
median Justice role during this time period as well. Yet,
White’s judicial philosophy and values remained consistent
148
over time. Thus, the changing face of the Court combined
with White’s unchanging mantra determined when and how
White found himself in the median Justice seat. As late as
141. See John Kamps, There’s Still No Label for Justice White, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1972, at M7 (“White has shown no partisan political tendencies since
he joined the [C]ourt.”).
142. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 68.
143. Ayers, supra note 7 (explaining the conservative/liberal split on the
Court and White’s unpredictability).
144. Liebman, supra note 114, at SM94.
145. Ayers, supra note 7.
146. Kamps, supra note 141, at M6.
147. See Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or
Staunch Conservative?, 52 J. POL. 530, 539–40 (1990) (discussing the 1972–
1974 bloc shifting of Powell, Stewart, and White); Ruth Marcus, White Becomes High Court’s Key Vote, WASH. POST, June 25, 1990, at A4 (noting that
the addition of Scalia, Kennedy, and O’Connor positioned White in the middle).
148. See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1409 (2003) (providing a review of Justice White’s opinions to support testimonials of his judicial restraint).
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1990, commentators continued to dub White a “key vote.” But
if you asked White’s former law clerk, Lance Liebman, he
would say, “If you’re there a long time, you know these things
150
come and go.”
In 1971, as he was simultaneously appointed to the Court
with then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, most people
151
expected Powell to side with the Nixon bloc of the Court. His
appointment was part of Nixon’s continuing attempt to “stack
152
the Court.” Yet, as time passed, Powell’s allegiance to the
Nixon appointees arguably decreased, and his identification as
153
a moderate median Justice solidified. Powell’s depiction was
overwhelmingly positive, described as a “balancer” and amelio154
rator of conflict. Some critics claimed that designating Powell
as the swing voter makes generalizations without reliable
155
quantitative support. Yet, these critics make the mistake of
assuming that being the median Justice, occupying a critical
role on the Court, receiving the swingman label, and being the
swing voter all mean the same thing. These critics nonetheless
continued to claim that Powell’s characterization was based
more “on a common sense view of judicial voting behavior” than
156
on empirical analysis.
The compiled figures do lend credence to this empirical
criticism since Powell has a much lower percentage in five-tofour/four-to-three majorities when compared to other median
157
Justices and swing Justices. Out of the 651 total decisions be149. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 147.
150. Id.
151. President Reagan made a successful dual nomination again in 1986,
promoting Associate Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice and placing Justice
Antonin Scalia on the Court. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 29.
152. Fred P. Graham, A Shift in the Center of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
1972, at E10.
153. But see Schultz & Howard, supra note 131 (questioning this “decreasing allegiance” as occurring in but a few types of cases and arguing that Powell most often voted with the Nixon bloc). When asked if “he would describe
himself as a moderate, Powell replied, ‘I don’t characterize myself any way.’”
Glen Elsasser & Janet Cawley, Powell Quits Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., June
27, 1987, at 1.
154. Blasecki, supra note 147, at 530; see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice
Powell Shaping Law as Swing Man on High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1987,
at 1 (describing Justice Powell “as the man in the middle of the Supreme
Court’s ideological divide”).
155. See Blasecki, supra note 147, at 532 (“Powell voted with the majority
in almost three-fourths of the Court’s 5-4 decisions (118 out of 161).” (quoting
Paul W. Kahn)).
156. Id.
157. Compare supra note 139 and accompanying text, with supra note 109
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tween 1976 and 1979, Justice Powell appeared in the majority
158
in 53 of the 90 five-to-four/four-to-three decisions. This meant
that in split decisions, Powell was in the majority only 59.9
159
Nevertheless, a common-sense view
percent of the time.
would not weaken the impact the public label has on Powell’s
decision-making legacy as a moderate in the middle. This is especially true given Powell’s pivotal vote in seminal First
Amendment cases, jury verdicts in criminal cases, affirmative
160
action, and gay rights. Powell’s most notable decision as the
median Justice was in 1978’s Regents of the University of Cali161
fornia v. Bakke. Powell’s compromising view upheld affirmative action programs for minorities but struck down an admissions program at the University of California Medical School
162
under federal civil rights law. Like White, Powell’s most
common characterization as median Justice pinned him as the
philosophical middle of the Court, regardless of whether that
163
was empirically true or not.

and accompanying text, and infra note 202 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 108. Note that Powell recused himself in one five-tofour case in both 1977 and 1979.
159. See supra note 108.
160. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986) (holding
that a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy was constitutional); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) (holding racial quotas
in admissions decisions unconstitutional, but also holding that race could be a
factor in the admissions process); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–09
(1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not allow reporters to conceal
the criminal activities of their confidential sources when responding to a grand
jury subpoena); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1972) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimity in a state jury trial); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378–79 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require unanimity in a state jury trial).
161. 438 U.S. 265.
162. See id.; see also J.F. terHorst, The Court Makes Itself Hard To Understand . . ., L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1978, at D5 (“They split 5 to 4 on each of them,
with Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. serving as swingman in each instance—for
admitting Bakke to the UC Davis medical school, against the use of racial quotas, but for the rule that race may be considered in weighing an applicant’s
qualifications.”); No One Lost: Swing Man Swung the Court, with Something
for All, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1978, at E1 (stating that the Court found affirmative action programs constitutional but strict quotas unconstitutional, with
Justice Powell serving as the “swing man” on both issues).
163. See Al Kamen, Powell Acts as Court Majority-Maker: Virginian Is
Swing Vote on Divided Bench, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1985, at A1 (“But if Justices were arrayed by philosophy, Powell would sit exactly in the middle.”); see
also Taylor, supra note 154 (describing Justice Powell “as the man in the middle of the Supreme Court’s ideological divide”).
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C. JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: THE FEMALE SWING
VOTER
This Section discusses Sandra Day O’Connor as the first
female swing voter on the Supreme Court. Subsection 1 contextualizes the conversation within the increased perception of
Court polarization. Subsection 2 seeks to emphasize the total
disappearance of swingman to describe pivotal actors on the
Court to the gender-neutral swing voter (eventually swing Justice) descriptor while explaining why O’Connor is most accurately portrayed as a swing voter.
1. An Era of Increasing Polarization
As part of his campaign platform for the 1980 presidential
election, Ronald Reagan declared that he would appoint the
164
first female Supreme Court Justice. In 1981, Reagan held
165
true to his word and appointed O’Connor. O’Connor spent the
166
majority of her tenure as a member of the Rehnquist Court.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist made unanimity a goal and
167
is regarded as a better leader than his predecessor, Burger,
“[c]ritics . . . excoriated the Court for departing from precedent
and for adhering too closely to it; for exercising too little activism and too little restraint; for being too result oriented and not
168
cognizant enough of the effects of its decisions.”
Later in O’Connor’s tenure, American government began to
169
show signs of increased political polarization. The Supreme
Court was no exception, leading the oftentimes outspoken
O’Connor to express concern about the political extremism and
170
polarizing “undertow dragging the Court into politics.” This
164. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 43.
165. See Ed Magnuson et al., The Brethren’s First Sister, TIME, July 20,
1981, at 10. O’Connor asserted herself as the “FWOTSC.” Sandra Day
O’Connor, Letter to the Editor, High Court’s ‘9 Men’ Were a Surprise to One,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/12/opinion/l-high
-court-s-9-men-were-a-surprise-to-one-225413.html.
166. Rehnquist served from 1986 to 2005. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at
35.
167. See id. at 27–29 (“Burger was not . . . effective as a leader of the
[C]ourt.”).
168. Id. at xii.
169. See generally Political Polarization, PEW RES. CTR., http://www
.pewresearch.org/packages/political-polarization (last visited Nov. 28, 2016)
(describing the increasing gap between liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats).
170. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 204; see also NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 131 (1996)
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polarization and O’Connor’s role on the Court is best explained
through an example of arguably one of the most politically
171
charged decisions the Court has ever made, Bush v. Gore.
The majority of five, including Kennedy, Thomas,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and O’Connor, drafted the opinion that effec172
tively decided the 2000 presidential election. This majority
faced heavy criticism. Scholars accused the Justices of deciding
based upon the “personal identity and political affiliation of the
173
litigants.” Additionally, several Justices encountered accusations of ethical violations in failing to recuse themselves from
174
the decision. Specifically, O’Connor and her husband allegedly made statements that a Gore victory would be a “personal
disaster” and would prevent her retirement, prompting a flood
175
of articles. Ultimately, the Court’s increasing separation di176
rected cases “to a single [J]ustice—O’Connor.” Commentators
and litigants alike focused their attention to the “O’Connor
Court,” recognizing its fracture and resorting themselves to un177
stable predictions of O’Connor’s vote.
2. The Obvious Swing Voter
178

Based on the events surrounding Bush v. Gore alone,
O’Connor is easily typecast as the swing voter. While her first
few years and overall voting behavior on the Court can be de(“[T]he Rehnquist Court . . . has suffered from a jurisprudential polarization.”).
171. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he Rehnquist
Court—the Court of Bush v. Gore—dwelled in the center of American political
life.”). But see Michael C. Dorf, Is There a Distinction Between Law and Politics? Yes, and the Bush v. Gore Decision Proves It, FINDLAW (Dec. 27, 2000),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20001227.html.
172. See 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7.
173. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 at 174 (2001). But see generally Ronald D. Rotunda,
Yet Another Article on Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 283 (2003) (responding
to arguments that the Justices decided the case based on their political preferences, not precedent).
174. In addition to O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas also faced accusations. See generally Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush
v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375 (2003)
(discussing the accusations against each Justice in depth).
175. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 142–44; Neumann, supra note 174, at 375–
78, 377 n.8.
176. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 204.
177. Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 3, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/03/magazine/a-majority-of-one.html; Op-Ed,
The O’Connor Court, WASH. POST (July 2, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101835.html.
178. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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scribed as conservative, her decision-making practices bothered
many who expected her to be more consistent and predictable
179
in that respect. Between 1993 and 2005, “more than a quarter of all Time and Newsweek articles discussing O’Connor la180
beled her as a swing voter.” This appears to be the most regular use of swing voter to describe any one Justice on the Court
up to that point.
During those twelve years spanning 1077 opinions,
O’Connor voted in the majority in 155 of the 544 five-to-four de181
cisions, or 69.9 percent of the time. Her method of assessing
the potential public reaction prior to acting gave her immense
182
power and encapsulated her swing Justice role. This involved
a close tethering of her rulings “to what most people wanted or
183
at least would accept.” She typically favored malleable stand184
ards over bright-line rules. Her preferred style of “pragmatism in service of principle” supplemented that power by bal185
Yet, O’Connor’s
ancing interests on a case-by-case basis.
perceived power threatened critics of her substantive decisions
who derided the female swing Justice for “legislating from the
186
bench.”
179. See Robert E. Riggs, Justice O’Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983
BYU L. REV. 1, 15; see also TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 58–59, 206–07 (providing
examples of the internal and external criticism of O’Connor’s unexpected deviation from conservatism).
180. Abigail Perkiss, A Look Back at Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Court
Legacy, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (July 1, 2016), http://blog
.constitutioncenter.org/2016/07/a-look-back-at-justice-sandra-day-oconnors
-court-legacy. As early as 1990, media outlets recognized O’Connor as a “critical ‘swing’ vote.” Stephen Wermiel, Sandra Day O’Connor Emerges as Key
Player in High Court Rulings, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1990, at A1.
181. The figures cited are taken from the Harvard Law Review’s 1982–
2006 surveys of the preceding Supreme Court Term. For a general explanation
of how the statistics are compiled, see The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The
Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005). See also supra note 108.
182. See Michael D. Lemonick & Viveca Novak, The Power Broker, TIME,
July 11, 2005, at 30.
183. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 7. O’Connor is also seen as a strong proponent of judicial independence, which seems to be in conflict with her practice
of taking the public temperature on issues. See Va McLean, Reflections of a
Retired Justice; Sandra Day O’Connor Says Judicial Independence Is Imperiled and Electing Judges Is Not Wise. The Immigration Debate? Spanish Was
Her Grandmother’s First Language, USA TODAY, June 8, 2006, at A21.
184. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876
(1992) (holding the “undue burden” standard as the test for abortion).
185. Craig Joyce, Afterword: Lazy B and the Nation’s Court: Pragmatism in
Service of Principle, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2006).
186. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 225; see also Dahlia Lithwick, A High Court
of One: The Role of the “Swing Voter” in the 2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SU-
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O’Connor’s role as swing Justice led her to be courted, so to
speak, by the eight male Justices eager to mold her “persuada187
ble mind.” In this manner, she rose to a position of perceived
influence, claiming to pursue centrism and moderation as not
188
only a judicial but also a political philosophy. Deemed “Supreme Sandra,” O’Connor’s “open mind” made her the “single
189
most powerful woman in America.” Nonetheless, O’Connor
190
did not embrace the swing voter label. One theory for this
lack of acceptance is that swing Justice was used more like an
191
insult when applied to her rather than as a descriptor. Portrayals of O’Connor’s assertion of power on the Court are riddled with sexism, influencing her characterization in both academia and the media. This is an apparent reflection of “a
history of obstacles for women,” as even pieces meant to praise
O’Connor’s accomplishments and unique position are rife with
192
gendered language, sexist connotations, and innuendos. In
this context, swing voter was probably meant to be more of a
slight to O’Connor than a compliment to individuality.

PREME COURT 13, 15 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 2004) (“The
outcry about O’Connor’s disproportionate influence is sometimes conflated
with a resentment of the way she decides cases.”).
187. Charles Lane, Courting O’Connor: Why the Chief Justice Isn’t the
Chief Justice, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at W10. The term “courting” implies
something more like dating than an analysis of a Justice’s judicial decisionmaking. A simple Google search produces results solely related to dating in a
romantic context. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/#q=courting (Google search
for “courting”) (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Swing voters in the electorate are
also often described as “persuadable.” See, e.g., Nate Silver, Swing Voters and
Elastic States, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 21, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/swing-voters-and-elastic-states; Ruy Teixeira, Why There Are Many
More Swing Voters than You Think, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 11, 2012), https://
newrepublic.com/article/102612/election-swing-voters-campaign-2012.
188. See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 7.
189. See Supreme Sandra, supra note 8.
190. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 177
(2007) (“O’Connor repeatedly insisted she wasn’t the deciding vote, but just
one of nine.”).
191. See Susan Gluck Mezey, Gender and the Federal Judiciary, in GENDER AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
229–32 (Sue Tolleson-Rinehart & Jyl L. Josephson eds., 2005).
192. Id. (“O’Connor wound up on the highest court in the land instead of
the typing pool because she rejected both limitations and victimhood. (Another
good lesson for the young of both genders.)”); see, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 2
(characterizing O’Connor as “a bit of a tease”). For a more in-depth critique of
the portrayals of women in leadership positions, see MISS REPRESENTATION
(Girls’ Club Entertainment 2011).
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D. JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY: THE MODERN SWING JUSTICE
This Section seeks to explore Kennedy’s depiction as the
Court’s current swing Justice, prompting an influx of public interest and criticism. Subsection 1 supports Kennedy’s swing
Justice characterization with a discussion of his unpredictable
193
decision-making style, harkening back to Matt Bors’ cartoon.
Subsection 2 provides the context for this modern characterization, previewing the implications that centuries of undefined
use has had on the Supreme Court, academics, the public, and
even the rule of law.
194

1. The Troublesome Swing Justice

A fellow Reagan appointee, Kennedy joined O’Connor on
195
the bench in 1988. The two at times shared or exchanged the
swing Justice label until O’Connor stepped down in July
196
2005. With O’Connor gone, Kennedy established himself as a
different kind of swing Justice, one creating more publicized
197
worry than O’Connor. In fact, his position on issues such as
capital punishment and use of foreign law in opinions encour198
aged conservative leaders to call for his impeachment. Just as
O’Connor shook the Court as the obvious female swing voter,
Kennedy represents a similarly provocative figure.
Kennedy does not consider himself a swing Justice, stating
that there is “a connotation of inconsistency, of change, but I
think it’s just the opposite. I think it’s the cases that change,
199
not the law.” As an initial “moderate conservative,” Kennedy
agreed with Rehnquist in ninety-three percent of the cases de193. See Bors, supra note 1.
194. Even Kennedy cannot grasp a tangible definition of swing voter. See
Marcia Coyle, Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term ‘Swing Vote,’ NAT’L
L.J. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202740827841/
Justice-Anthony-Kennedy-Loathes-the-Term-Swing-Vote?slreturn=201601292
33646 (“And if you want to get on the wrong side of Kennedy, call him the high
[C]ourt’s ‘swing vote.’ ‘I hate that term,’ he said. ‘I get this visual image of spatial gyrations. The cases swing; I don’t.’”).
195. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 45–46 (describing the confirmation
process that led to Justice Kennedy’s nomination).
196. See William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Resigns,
WASH. POST (July 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101842.html (discussing Justice O’Connor’s decision to resign in 2005).
197. See Dahlia Lithwick, Swing Time, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www
.slate.com/id/2134421 (“Kennedy uniquely engenders hysteria . . . .”).
198. See Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty,
WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3.
199. GREENBURG, supra note 190.
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200

cided while the two shared the bench. But, whether he believes it or not, Kennedy has been the swing Justice on the
201
Roberts Court since 2005. Out of 770 total opinions, Kennedy
has appeared in the majority in 140 of the 169 five-to-four deci202
203
sions. This is an impressive 82.8 percent. It is not Kennedy’s existence as a supposedly moderate Justice that necessarily raises issues, since a moderate philosophy is respected and
has arguably existed on the Supreme Court in some form for
204
decades. Instead, the concern is the threatening perception
that Kennedy—a Justice “Blackmunized” in terms of his views
on social issues—holds the power to sway decisions singularly
205
as swing Justice. This is what makes Kennedy’s role on the
Court, as perceived by many academics, advocates, and the
public, problematic.
Commentators have recently taken to the idea that it is
206
Kennedy’s world, and we are just living in it. This proposition
is supplemented by the fact that Kennedy “has been in the ma207
jority in virtually every notable 5–4 case.” After O’Connor’s
departure, Kennedy stood “alone in the middle—and that en-

200. David G. Savage, Anthony M. Kennedy and the Road Not Taken, in A
YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 35, 39 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds.,
2004).
201. See Branigin et al., supra note 196 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s
2005 resignation, resulting in Kennedy solely inhabiting the swing voter role).
202. See supra note 108.
203. See id.
204. See Lithwick, supra note 186, at 14. In fact, Kennedy’s moderate philosophy has been described as “romantic,” reminiscent of the “men with grand
visions about the role of the Court in society.” Edward Lazarus, The Pivotal
Role of Justice Anthony Kennedy: Why the Supreme Court’s Romantic May Only Become More Influential over Time, FINDLAW (Aug. 7, 2003), http://writ
.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030807.html; Lithwick, supra note 186, at 28.
205. Richard Brust, The Man in the Middle: Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in
the Gay Rights Case Underlines His Growing Influence, 89 A.B.A. J. 24, 25
(2003).
206. See Dahlia Lithwick, How the Supreme Court Justices Spent Their
Summer Vacation, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/10/supreme_court_summer_vacations_can_
justices_forgive_one_another.html.
207. Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Reasoning,
122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 179 (2008); see Lani Guinier et al., The Supreme Court
2007 Term: The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 522 (2008) (showing that
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in eight of twelve five-to-four decisions in
the 2007 term); see also Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The “Swing Voter” Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free
Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 209, 209–17 (2004) (advocating for an alternative form
of the swing voter using Kennedy as an example).
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208

hances his importance.” Kennedy’s position potentially has
identifiable consequences. One scholar has noted that “the frequency of polarizing decisions that involve five-to-four votes
along predictable ideological lines may contribute to the [proper] public perception that the Supreme Court has become a po209
litical institution rather than a legal institution.” Kennedy
represents the Court’s modern permutation of the swing Justice. He is a figure that presents a slew of questions regarding
the implications of the perception of such a figure and the implications such an actor has on the rule of law and Supreme
Court jurisprudence more generally.
2. The Value of Precedent
The importance of stare decisis in the American legal system and the preservation of the judiciary as an objective gatekeeper of the law implies that precedent should mean some210
thing. The appearance, even if only an appearance, that one
person holds the ability to dictate the maintenance or destruc211
tion of precedent is troublesome. In Justice Breyer’s words,
“It is not often in law that so few have so quickly changed so
212
much.” The decision to overturn or maintain precedents has
obvious political consequences. This is the work of Supreme
Court Justices. In his role as the modern swing Justice, Kennedy has at times ignored stare decisis and either frustrated or
encouraged attempts to overturn significant precedents, often213
times agonizing over the law in the process.
208. Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the
Middle, WASH. POST (May 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051201586.html.
209. Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245,
247–48 (2016).
210. See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 335–36 (describing the final day of the
2007 term in which Breyer asked, “What has happened to stare decisis?”).
211. See Lithwick, supra note 186, at 20.
212. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 336; see also Erin Miller, Doubts About
Death, SCOTUSBLOG (May 27, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2010/05/doubts-about-death.
213. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right, even for same-sex couples); Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (holding that a corporation is a person within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act’s protection of a person’s exercise of religion); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010) (holding that limiting corporate
contributions to political action committees infringes the First Amendment
rights of corporations); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that an anti-sodomy statute is a violation of the Due Process clause); see
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Dahlia Lithwick, a prominent Supreme Court commentator, posits that “[t]he true paradox of swing voters is not that
they hold more influence than their colleagues, but that the
214
public believes it holds more influence over them.” If true,
this proposition is troubling. But, what this writer finds even
more troubling is the inability of academics, media, and the
public to differentiate and identify the Court’s swing Justice
and median Justice, particularly failing to recognize that these
actors are not always one in the same. Yet, the failure of many
of these same actors to distinguish the swing Justice and the
median Justice from the swing voter, a wholly separate phenomenon in American political culture, is most concerning.
These case studies emphasize swingman, swing voter,
swing Justice, and median Justice’s fractured use. Reed was
labeled a swingman, but his ideology and beliefs were generally
215
unknown. Swingman’s use as a descriptor for Reed was likely
due to its fresh development in the Supreme Court context and
the lack of a more solidified descriptor for who Reed was and
how he behaved on the bench. White and Powell may not have
been the true ideological medians of the Court, but because of
the intense divide between the Nixon and Burger appointees,
the most accurate descriptor for the two was as median Justic216
es. In her approach to cases and the law, O’Connor was more
like an ideological median. Yet, commentators and the public
categorized her as a swing voter, the unpredictable wild card
217
wherein the dangers of the Court laid. This characterization
was especially salient given the scrutiny seemingly fueled by
sexism associated with her apparent power to singularly decide
cases. Finally, many perceive Kennedy as extreme on the
bench, harnessing unlimited power, not as a median Justice,
218
but as a truly unpredictable swing Justice. But, Kennedy
would say otherwise, maintaining that he is not a swing Justice
219
at all, proposing that “[t]he cases swing; the [J]ustices don’t.”
Jeffrey Rosen, Annals of Law: The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at
82.
214. Lithwick, supra note 186, at 20.
215. See Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 717.
216. See MacKenzie, supra note 129 (discussing the stark split between
holdovers from the Warren Court and new Nixon appointees).
217. See, e.g., Wermiel, supra note 180 (referring to Justice O’Connor as
the “swing vote” and detailing occasions in which she sided with the Court’s
liberal bloc rather than her conservative colleagues).
218. See Coyle, supra note 194 (noting that Justice Kennedy hates his
“swing vote” identification).
219. See GREENBURG, supra note 190.
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These five examples illustrate just how haphazardly pivotal
Justices are labeled. The terms used to describe them are employed without regard to their actual meanings, defining very
different actors behaving in very distinct ways on the Court.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FAILURE TO
DISTINGUISH SWING VOTER, SWING JUSTICE, AND
MEDIAN JUSTICE
Having established that there exists considerable confusion
as to the meaning of swing voter and swing Justice in the context of Supreme Court Justices, this Part argues that there are
serious implications resulting from this confusion. Section A
contends that the haphazard use of swing voter, swing Justice,
and median Justice without consideration for the chosen term’s
effect results in conceptual confusion for academics of several
disciplines as well as a troubling amount of unacknowledged
public confusion. Section B argues that the specific misuse of
swing voter to describe actors that are more accurately described as swing Justices and/or median Justices illustrates the
lack of a true distinction between law and politics, admitting
the reality of legal realism. Section C implores scholars to draw
a sharper distinction between the median Justice and the
swing voter and swing Justice, questioning the median Justice
theorem’s assumptions and assessing how these assumptions
contribute to the existing ambivalence surrounding the swing
voter and swing Justice.
A. HAPHAZARD TERM USAGE RESULTS IN CONCEPTUAL
CONFUSION
Those using the terms swing voter, swing Justice, and median Justice might benefit from increased awareness of past
misuse and a commitment to conscious use in the future. As evidenced by the case studies in Part II, academics conflate and
confuse labels to mischaracterize Justices all too often, indiscriminately using terms without truly understanding their underlying differences. This is dangerous since a linguistic designation, especially in academia, can impact the entire conclusion
of a study or piece of research. Lack of care when labeling Supreme Court Justices as swing voter, swing Justice, and/or median Justice leads to results based upon potentially faulty assumptions, skewing outcomes and affecting the reliability and
accuracy of the final product. Use of terms without a thorough
understanding of their respective meanings leads to fundamen-
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tally inaccurate results, muddled by unacknowledged and unaddressed assumptions. Failing to recognize these differences is
a fundamental misstep. This failure prevents meaningful conversation and results in a lack of genuine understanding in any
given discipline. Thus far, swing voter, swing Justice, and median Justice’s contextual differences have gone relatively unrecognized, and the terms remain obfuscated and unrefined.
In order to completely understand the implications and
make accurate conclusions in analyses and studies of these actors, academics should consider the connotations accompanying
terms when assigning them to various Supreme Court Justices.
Nevertheless, the process of refining and differentiating these
terms does not begin and end with academics. Commentators,
advocates, and the public more generally are confused about
the true meaning of swing voter, swing Justice, and median
Justice too, arguably even more than academics. If academics
do not maintain, or even acknowledge, the differences between
various actors, how is the public expected to know and understand the difference? This confusion alienates the public and
perhaps results in deeper-set animosity towards the Supreme
Court, other branches of government, and potentially the law
more generally. This disconnect should be concerning since it
upsets people’s perceptions about the value of their own role in
democracy. A chasm so deep might even discourage the individual faith and participation that is so crucial to the American
220
system.
B. ROOTED IN LEGAL REALISM
The Supreme Court’s crucial Justice matters most in close
cases: whether it be a stable ideological median consistently
balancing competing factions or an unpredictable wildcard
221
vote. The confused identification of swing Justices as swing
voters is particularly illustrative of an implication beyond mere
confusion. It demonstrates, and perhaps even more problematic, reinforces, the distinction, or lack thereof, between law and
222
politics. This absence of a true distinction between law and
220. See One Vote Can Make a Difference, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Apr. 7,
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2015/04/07/
one-vote-can-make-a-difference (providing examples of local races in which one
or two votes decided the outcome).
221. See Lithwick, supra note 186, at 20.
222. See generally THE LAW/POLITICS DISTINCTION IN CONTEMPORARY
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION (Bogdan Iancu ed., 2009) (discussing the blurry
distinction between law and politics through a collection of works).

MCGAVER_MLR

2017]

1/25/2017 8:06 PM

SWING VOTER ON THE SUPREME COURT

1283

223

politics is a central tenet of legal realism. Swing voter’s simultaneous use to describe different types of actors in two independent branches of government is concerning. The dual use of
such a contested term is troubling because the branches of
American government are so painstakingly separated in other
224
contexts.
Separation of powers is at the heart of the American legal
system. It is touted as one of the greatest achievements of modern democracy, striking a “happy mean” that “combines the en225
ergy of government with the security of private rights.” The
commonplace, interchangeable use of swing voter in both the
electoral and judicial contexts blurs this separation, failing to
demonstrate that there are actually any real differences between the swing voter on the Supreme Court and the swing
voter in the electorate. In fact, it complicates the apparent existence of those differences. This lack of linguistic separation
implies a lack of actual separation. It begs questions about our
systematic beliefs, beliefs that rely on the maintenance of the
rule of law above the meddling world of politics and popular
elections. If one person in either branch of government has the
power to change the law and overturn precedent based on what
they ate for breakfast, the implication is that stare decisis as
an institutionalized preservation practice is all for naught: just
226
part of the greater myth of the law-politics distinction. If the
law-politics distinction is no distinction at all, then what really
227
separates the Court from elections or legislating? Is judging
really different?
A thorough understanding of swing voter’s etymological
history and politically charged connotations lays bare an un223. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, art. II, art. III (detailing the separate
powers of the three branches in American government).
225. William B. Gwyn, The Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of
Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS—DOES IT STILL WORK?
65, 66 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (quoting Alexander
Hamilton).
226. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 162 (1973) (“[A] trial judge, because of overeating at lunch,
may be so somnolent in the afternoon court-session that he fails to hear an
important item of testimony and so disregards it when deciding the case.”).
227. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on
its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not
be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors
of judicial action.” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407
(1989))).
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stable reliance on the law-politics distinction. A distinction that
has long been utilized to preserve beliefs about what distinguishes the judicial from the political. A distinction that exists
when it preserves the institutional status quo but sometimes
228
disappears when it would be less convenient. The law-politics
distinction mystifies the rule of law, promoting the notion that
we are ruled by law and not men. But ultimately we are ruled
by men: the elite administrators of the law, chosen not by the
public their decisions govern, but by the political party in power at the time of their appointment. With that understanding,
it is clear that the law-politics distinction is nothing more than
a bedtime story that members of the legal community tell
themselves and the general public to cloak the political nature
of their work.
C. THE MEDIAN JUSTICE IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH THE SWING
JUSTICE
The Supreme Court swing Justice is not automatically
synonymous with the median Justice identified by any given
political or social science study. This dissimilarity is especially
true when a study focuses on the general voting behavior of a
Justice as compared to an assessment of the votes in a particu229
lar case, range of years, or topic area. The focus of most studies that apply the median voter theorem is on mathematical
230
precision and/or game theory. The existing imprecision of the
way swing voter, swing Justice, and median Justice are used in
these studies amounts to faulty analytics, lacking important
distinctions that can and ought to be made for clarity, coherence, and sound reasoning. This is especially relevant in political and social science research, where the results oftentimes
depend entirely on the definition of what exactly constitutes a
228. A stark example of this institutional preservation exists in the flood of
literature on the legacy of recently deceased Justices. This literature emphasizes the difference between the decaying body versus the intact legal mind.
See, e.g., Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Dies, WASH. POST
(Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
09/03/AR2005090301911.html; Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the
Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0.
229. Compare Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42 (analyzing the voting behavior of Reed in particular), with Grofman & Brazill, supra note 80 (performing a
multidimensional analysis to identify the median Justices from 1953 to 1991).
230. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for
Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187,
190–92 (1996).
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swing voter, swing Justice, or median Justice in any given context. This is important to consider because the use of an unclear definition results in a slew of unclear conclusions.
The existing imprecision matters because it assumes that
there is a median on the Court who stabilizes coherent competing blocs or factions operating in the same way, issue-to-issue,
231
case-to-case. Those scientists who adhere to the median Justice theorem contribute significantly to Supreme Court scholar232
ship. With that in mind, this Note proposes that the use of
swing voter, swing Justice, and median Justice in works employing the median Justice theorem be just as technical, nuanced, and mathematical as the median Justice theorem itself.
By distinguishing the median Justice linguistically and analytically from the swing voter and swing Justice, median Justice
theorem can avoid the pervading ambiguity accompanying the
phrases’ uses, clouded by a variety of unknown and misunderstood connotations. Median Justice theorem is just a piece of a
much more complicated discourse about the voting behaviors
and practices of the Supreme Court, one that has been insufficiently attended to and an unrecognized contributor to the confusion surrounding what it really means to be labeled the Supreme Court swing voter.
CONCLUSION
The meaning of “swing voter” is not as straightforward as
generally assumed. Using the crucial tools of historical etymology and intellectual history, this Note seeks to address swing
voter’s meaning conflation, confusion, and fluctuation between
several distinctive and contradictory definitions. These tools allow us to see that the implications of such meaning conflation
are severe.
The arbitrary use of these terms results in conceptual confusion for academics and the public at large. Academic research
is specifically affected by a sheer lack of particularity and attention to detail, threatening the legitimacy and accuracy of research done about these actors. In addition, this confusion
leads to increased public alienation and overall discontent and
lack of participation in government. The specific use of swing
231. See Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 718 (“Are there two cohesive
four-Justice blocs?”).
232. See Martin et al., supra note 75, at 1278; see also Baker, supra note
230, at 207 (“[D]oes the identity of the Court’s median or most powerful Justice matter? . . . [T]he answer is likely ‘yes.’”).
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voter to describe what is maybe more accurately described as
swing Justice and/or median Justice serves as an example of
the lack of a true distinction between law and politics and failure to accurately distinguish specific terms and the actors those
terms seek to define. Through historical etymologies and intellectual histories, we might be able to better recognize, understand, and apply contested concepts, like swing voter, with increased awareness and clarity.

